1. 05 Oct, 2012 1 commit
    • antirez's avatar
      Warn when configured maxmemory value seems odd. · 05e06e15
      antirez authored
      This commit warns the user with a log at "warning" level if:
      
      1) After the server startup the maxmemory limit was found to be < 1MB.
      2) After a CONFIG SET command modifying the maxmemory setting the limit
      is set to a value that is smaller than the currently used memory.
      
      The behaviour of the Redis server is unmodified, and this wil not make
      the CONFIG SET command or a wrong configuration in redis.conf less
      likely to create problems, but at least this will make aware most users
      about a possbile error they committed without resorting to external
      help.
      
      However no warning is issued if, as a result of loading the AOF or RDB
      file, we are very near the maxmemory setting, or key eviction will be
      needed in order to go under the specified maxmemory setting. The reason
      is that in servers configured as a cache with an aggressive
      maxmemory-policy most of the times restarting the server will cause this
      condition to happen if persistence is not switched off.
      
      This fixes issue #429.
      05e06e15
  2. 27 Sep, 2012 1 commit
  3. 31 Aug, 2012 1 commit
    • antirez's avatar
      Sentinel: Redis-side support for slave priority. · 48d26a48
      antirez authored
      A Redis slave can now be configured with a priority, that is an integer
      number that is shown in INFO output and can be get and set using the
      redis.conf file or the CONFIG GET/SET command.
      
      This field is used by Sentinel during slave election. A slave with lower
      priority is preferred. A slave with priority zero is never elected (and
      is considered to be impossible to elect even if it is the only slave
      available).
      
      A next commit will add support in the Sentinel side as well.
      48d26a48
  4. 21 Jun, 2012 1 commit
    • antirez's avatar
      Fixed a timing attack on AUTH (Issue #560). · 4b3865cb
      antirez authored
      The way we compared the authentication password using strcmp() allowed
      an attacker to gain information about the password using a well known
      class of attacks called "timing attacks".
      
      The bug appears to be practically not exploitable in most modern systems
      running Redis since even using multiple bytes of differences in the
      input at a time instead of one the difference in running time in in the
      order of 10 nanoseconds, making it hard to exploit even on LAN. However
      attacks always get better so we are providing a fix ASAP.
      
      The new implementation uses two fixed length buffers and a constant time
      comparison function, with the goal of:
      
      1) Completely avoid leaking information about the content of the
      password, since the comparison is always performed between 512
      characters and without conditionals.
      2) Partially avoid leaking information about the length of the
      password.
      
      About "2" we still have a stage in the code where the real password and
      the user provided password are copied in the static buffers, we also run
      two strlen() operations against the two inputs, so the running time
      of the comparison is a fixed amount plus a time proportional to
      LENGTH(A)+LENGTH(B). This means that the absolute time of the operation
      performed is still related to the length of the password in some way,
      but there is no way to change the input in order to get a difference in
      the execution time in the comparison that is not just proportional to
      the string provided by the user (because the password length is fixed).
      
      Thus in practical terms the user should try to discover LENGTH(PASSWORD)
      looking at the whole execution time of the AUTH command and trying to
      guess a proportionality between the whole execution time and the
      password length: this appears to be mostly unfeasible in the real world.
      
      Also protecting from this attack is not very useful in the case of Redis
      as a brute force attack is anyway feasible if the password is too short,
      while with a long password makes it not an issue that the attacker knows
      the length.
      4b3865cb
  5. 18 Apr, 2012 1 commit
  6. 13 Apr, 2012 2 commits
    • antirez's avatar
      Stop access to global vars. Not configurable. · 97cab309
      antirez authored
      After considering the interaction between ability to delcare globals in
      scripts using the 'global' function, and the complexities related to
      hanlding replication and AOF in a sane way with globals AND ability to
      turn protection On and Off, we reconsidered the design. The new design
      makes clear that there is only one good way to write Redis scripts, that
      is not using globals. In the rare cases state must be retained across
      calls a Redis key can be used.
      97cab309
    • antirez's avatar
      3e6a4463
  7. 10 Apr, 2012 1 commit
  8. 28 Mar, 2012 1 commit
  9. 25 Mar, 2012 2 commits
    • antirez's avatar
      CONFIG RESETSTAT resets two more fields. · d0407c2d
      antirez authored
      d0407c2d
    • antirez's avatar
      New INFO field aof_delayed_fsync introduced. · 81f32c7b
      antirez authored
      This new field counts all the times Redis is configured with AOF enabled and
      fsync policy 'everysec', but the previous fsync performed by the
      background thread was not able to complete within two seconds, forcing
      Redis to perform a write against the AOF file while the fsync is still
      in progress (likely a blocking operation).
      81f32c7b
  10. 22 Mar, 2012 1 commit
    • antirez's avatar
      Support for read-only slaves. Semantical fixes. · 05406168
      antirez authored
      This commit introduces support for read only slaves via redis.conf and CONFIG GET/SET commands. Also various semantical fixes are implemented here:
      
      1) MULTI/EXEC with only read commands now work where the server is into a state where writes (or commands increasing memory usage) are not allowed. Before this patch everything inside a transaction would fail in this conditions.
      
      2) Scripts just calling read-only commands will work against read only
      slaves, when the server is out of memory, or when persistence is into an
      error condition. Before the patch EVAL always failed in this condition.
      05406168
  11. 10 Mar, 2012 2 commits
  12. 08 Mar, 2012 1 commit
  13. 07 Mar, 2012 1 commit
    • antirez's avatar
      By default Redis refuses writes with an error if the latest BGSAVE failed (and... · 4d3bbf35
      antirez authored
      By default Redis refuses writes with an error if the latest BGSAVE failed (and at least one save point is configured). However people having good monitoring systems may prefer a server that continues to work, since they are notified that there are problems by their monitoring systems. This commit implements the ability to turn the feature on or off via redis.conf and CONFIG SET.
      4d3bbf35
  14. 24 Jan, 2012 1 commit
  15. 16 Jan, 2012 1 commit
  16. 03 Jan, 2012 1 commit
  17. 21 Dec, 2011 4 commits
  18. 01 Dec, 2011 1 commit
  19. 31 Oct, 2011 2 commits
  20. 26 Oct, 2011 1 commit
  21. 10 Oct, 2011 1 commit
  22. 05 Oct, 2011 1 commit
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  24. 27 Jul, 2011 1 commit
  25. 12 Jul, 2011 1 commit
  26. 30 Jun, 2011 1 commit
  27. 25 Jun, 2011 1 commit
  28. 10 Jun, 2011 3 commits
  29. 25 May, 2011 1 commit
  30. 07 Apr, 2011 1 commit
  31. 29 Mar, 2011 1 commit