- 05 Oct, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
This commit warns the user with a log at "warning" level if: 1) After the server startup the maxmemory limit was found to be < 1MB. 2) After a CONFIG SET command modifying the maxmemory setting the limit is set to a value that is smaller than the currently used memory. The behaviour of the Redis server is unmodified, and this wil not make the CONFIG SET command or a wrong configuration in redis.conf less likely to create problems, but at least this will make aware most users about a possbile error they committed without resorting to external help. However no warning is issued if, as a result of loading the AOF or RDB file, we are very near the maxmemory setting, or key eviction will be needed in order to go under the specified maxmemory setting. The reason is that in servers configured as a cache with an aggressive maxmemory-policy most of the times restarting the server will cause this condition to happen if persistence is not switched off. This fixes issue #429.
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- 27 Sep, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
This commit implements the first, beta quality implementation of Redis Sentinel, a distributed monitoring system for Redis with notification and automatic failover capabilities. More info at http://redis.io/topics/sentinel
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- 31 Aug, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
A Redis slave can now be configured with a priority, that is an integer number that is shown in INFO output and can be get and set using the redis.conf file or the CONFIG GET/SET command. This field is used by Sentinel during slave election. A slave with lower priority is preferred. A slave with priority zero is never elected (and is considered to be impossible to elect even if it is the only slave available). A next commit will add support in the Sentinel side as well.
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- 21 Jun, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
The way we compared the authentication password using strcmp() allowed an attacker to gain information about the password using a well known class of attacks called "timing attacks". The bug appears to be practically not exploitable in most modern systems running Redis since even using multiple bytes of differences in the input at a time instead of one the difference in running time in in the order of 10 nanoseconds, making it hard to exploit even on LAN. However attacks always get better so we are providing a fix ASAP. The new implementation uses two fixed length buffers and a constant time comparison function, with the goal of: 1) Completely avoid leaking information about the content of the password, since the comparison is always performed between 512 characters and without conditionals. 2) Partially avoid leaking information about the length of the password. About "2" we still have a stage in the code where the real password and the user provided password are copied in the static buffers, we also run two strlen() operations against the two inputs, so the running time of the comparison is a fixed amount plus a time proportional to LENGTH(A)+LENGTH(B). This means that the absolute time of the operation performed is still related to the length of the password in some way, but there is no way to change the input in order to get a difference in the execution time in the comparison that is not just proportional to the string provided by the user (because the password length is fixed). Thus in practical terms the user should try to discover LENGTH(PASSWORD) looking at the whole execution time of the AUTH command and trying to guess a proportionality between the whole execution time and the password length: this appears to be mostly unfeasible in the real world. Also protecting from this attack is not very useful in the case of Redis as a brute force attack is anyway feasible if the password is too short, while with a long password makes it not an issue that the attacker knows the length.
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- 18 Apr, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
1) Don't accept maxclients set to < 0 2) Allow maxclients < 1024, it is useful for testing.
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- 13 Apr, 2012 2 commits
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antirez authored
After considering the interaction between ability to delcare globals in scripts using the 'global' function, and the complexities related to hanlding replication and AOF in a sane way with globals AND ability to turn protection On and Off, we reconsidered the design. The new design makes clear that there is only one good way to write Redis scripts, that is not using globals. In the rare cases state must be retained across calls a Redis key can be used.
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antirez authored
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- 10 Apr, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
It is now possible to enable/disable RDB checksum computation from redis.conf or via CONFIG SET/GET. Also CONFIG SET support added for rdbcompression as well.
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- 28 Mar, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 25 Mar, 2012 2 commits
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
This new field counts all the times Redis is configured with AOF enabled and fsync policy 'everysec', but the previous fsync performed by the background thread was not able to complete within two seconds, forcing Redis to perform a write against the AOF file while the fsync is still in progress (likely a blocking operation).
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- 22 Mar, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
This commit introduces support for read only slaves via redis.conf and CONFIG GET/SET commands. Also various semantical fixes are implemented here: 1) MULTI/EXEC with only read commands now work where the server is into a state where writes (or commands increasing memory usage) are not allowed. Before this patch everything inside a transaction would fail in this conditions. 2) Scripts just calling read-only commands will work against read only slaves, when the server is out of memory, or when persistence is into an error condition. Before the patch EVAL always failed in this condition.
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- 10 Mar, 2012 2 commits
- 08 Mar, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 07 Mar, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
By default Redis refuses writes with an error if the latest BGSAVE failed (and at least one save point is configured). However people having good monitoring systems may prefer a server that continues to work, since they are notified that there are problems by their monitoring systems. This commit implements the ability to turn the feature on or off via redis.conf and CONFIG SET.
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- 24 Jan, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
Client output buffer limits: configuration of parameters for the different classes of clients implemented.
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- 16 Jan, 2012 1 commit
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antirez authored
It is now posible to flush all the previous saving points in redis.conf by using a save directive with a single empty string argument, like it happens for CONFIG SET save.
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- 03 Jan, 2012 1 commit
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Pieter Noordhuis authored
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- 21 Dec, 2011 4 commits
- 01 Dec, 2011 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 31 Oct, 2011 2 commits
- 26 Oct, 2011 1 commit
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Nathan Florea authored
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- 10 Oct, 2011 1 commit
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Nathan Florea authored
Added a configuration directive to allow a user to specify the permissions to be granted to the Unix socket file. I followed the format Pieter and Salvatore discusses in issue #85 ( https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/85).
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- 05 Oct, 2011 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 04 Oct, 2011 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 27 Jul, 2011 1 commit
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Pieter Noordhuis authored
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- 12 Jul, 2011 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 30 Jun, 2011 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 25 Jun, 2011 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 10 Jun, 2011 3 commits
- 25 May, 2011 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 07 Apr, 2011 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 29 Mar, 2011 1 commit
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antirez authored
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