- 13 Jun, 2018 11 commits
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antirez authored
Again thanks to @oranagra. The object idle time does not fit into an int sometimes: use the native type that the serialization function will get as argument, which is uint64_t.
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antirez authored
Since the introduction of ZPOP makes this needed. Thanks to @oranagra for reporting.
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antirez authored
I'm not sure how this escaped the attention of Redis users for years, but finally @oranagra reported this issue... Thanks to Oran.
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
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Baoyi Chen authored
fix [#5005](https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/5005)
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antirez authored
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it. The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the static buffer only at the end.
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antirez authored
After the first fix to the struct package I found another similar problem, which is fixed by this patch. It could be reproduced easily by running the following script: return struct.unpack('f', "xxxxxxxxxxxxx",-3) The above will access bytes before the 'data' pointer.
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antirez authored
@soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
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antirez authored
During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected. Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest version shipped by the author.
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antirez authored
During an auditing effort, the Apple Vulnerability Research team discovered a critical Redis security issue affecting the Lua scripting part of Redis. -- Description of the problem Several years ago I merged a pull request including many small changes at the Lua MsgPack library (that originally I authored myself). The Pull Request entered Redis in commit 90b6337c, in 2014. Unfortunately one of the changes included a variadic Lua function that lacked the check for the available Lua C stack. As a result, calling the "pack" MsgPack library function with a large number of arguments, results into pushing into the Lua C stack a number of new values proportional to the number of arguments the function was called with. The pushed values, moreover, are controlled by untrusted user input. This in turn causes stack smashing which we believe to be exploitable, while not very deterministic, but it is likely that an exploit could be created targeting specific versions of Redis executables. However at its minimum the issue results in a DoS, crashing the Redis server. -- Versions affected Versions greater or equal to Redis 2.8.18 are affected. -- Reproducing Reproduce with this (based on the original reproduction script by Apple security team): https://gist.github.com/antirez/82445fcbea6d9b19f97014cc6cc79f8a -- Verification of the fix The fix was tested in the following way: 1) I checked that the problem is no longer observable running the trigger. 2) The Lua code was analyzed to understand the stack semantics, and that actually enough stack is allocated in all the cases of mp_pack() calls. 3) The mp_pack() function was modified in order to show exactly what items in the stack were being set, to make sure that there is no silent overflow even after the fix. -- Credits Thank you to the Apple team and to the other persons that helped me checking the patch and coordinating this communication.
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- 12 Jun, 2018 28 commits
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antirez authored
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Shen Longxing authored
The active-defrag-threshold-lower/active-defrag-threshold-upper min/max value in redis.conf should be consistent with 'config set' command.
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antirez authored
See issue #5006. The comment in the code was also wrong and was rectified as well.
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antirez authored
See issue #5005 comments.
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antirez authored
A user with many connections (10 thousand) on a single Redis server reports in issue #4983 that sometimes Redis is idle becuase at the same time many clients need to resize their query buffer according to the old policy. It looks like this was created by the fact that we allow the query buffer to grow without problems to a size up to PROTO_MBULK_BIG_ARG normally, but when the client is idle we immediately are more strict, and a query buffer greater than 1024 bytes is already enough to trigger the resize. So for instance if most of the clients stop at the same time this issue should be easily triggered. This behavior actually looks odd, and there should be only a clear limit after we say, let's look at this query buffer to check if it's time to resize it. This commit puts the limit at PROTO_MBULK_BIG_ARG, and the check is performed both if compared to the peak usage the current usage is too big, or if the client is idle. Then when the check is performed, to waste just a few kbytes is considered enough to proceed with the resize. This should fix the issue.
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antirez authored
We unblocked the client too early, when the group name object was no longer valid in client->bpop, so propagating XCLAIM later in streamPropagateXCLAIM() deferenced a field already set to NULL.
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antirez authored
Removing the fix about 50% of the times the test will not be able to pass cleanly. It's very hard to write a test that will always fail, or actually, it is possible but then it's likely that it will consistently pass if we change some random bit, so better to use randomization here.
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antirez authored
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zhaozhao.zz authored
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zhaozhao.zz authored
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michael-grunder authored
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shenlongxing authored
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
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shenlongxing authored
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
Also add the concept of size/items limit, instead of just having as limit the number of bytes.
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shenlongxing authored
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michael-grunder authored
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Krzysztof Filipek authored
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zhaozhao.zz authored
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zhaozhao.zz authored
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zhaozhao.zz authored
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zhaozhao.zz authored
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- 06 Jun, 2018 1 commit
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antirez authored
Close #4989.
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