1. 13 Jun, 2018 3 commits
    • antirez's avatar
      Security: more cmsgpack fixes by @soloestoy. · 5ccb6f7a
      antirez authored
      @soloestoy sent me this additional fixes, after searching for similar
      problems to the one reported in mp_pack(). I'm committing the changes
      because it was not possible during to make a public PR to protect Redis
      users and give Redis providers some time to patch their systems.
      5ccb6f7a
    • antirez's avatar
      Security: update Lua struct package for security. · 1eb08bcd
      antirez authored
      During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
      we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
      a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
      overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
      Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
      EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.
      
      Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
      version shipped by the author.
      1eb08bcd
    • antirez's avatar
      Security: fix Lua cmsgpack library stack overflow. · 52a00201
      antirez authored
      During an auditing effort, the Apple Vulnerability Research team discovered
      a critical Redis security issue affecting the Lua scripting part of Redis.
      
      -- Description of the problem
      
      Several years ago I merged a pull request including many small changes at
      the Lua MsgPack library (that originally I authored myself). The Pull
      Request entered Redis in commit 90b6337c, in 2014.
      Unfortunately one of the changes included a variadic Lua function that
      lacked the check for the available Lua C stack. As a result, calling the
      "pack" MsgPack library function with a large number of arguments, results
      into pushing into the Lua C stack a number of new values proportional to
      the number of arguments the function was called with. The pushed values,
      moreover, are controlled by untrusted user input.
      
      This in turn causes stack smashing which we believe to be exploitable,
      while not very deterministic, but it is likely that an exploit could be
      created targeting specific versions of Redis executables. However at its
      minimum the issue results in a DoS, crashing the Redis server.
      
      -- Versions affected
      
      Versions greater or equal to Redis 2.8.18 are affected.
      
      -- Reproducing
      
      Reproduce with this (based on the original reproduction script by
      Apple security team):
      
      https://gist.github.com/antirez/82445fcbea6d9b19f97014cc6cc79f8a
      
      -- Verification of the fix
      
      The fix was tested in the following way:
      
      1) I checked that the problem is no longer observable running the trigger.
      2) The Lua code was analyzed to understand the stack semantics, and that
      actually enough stack is allocated in all the cases of mp_pack() calls.
      3) The mp_pack() function was modified in order to show exactly what items
      in the stack were being set, to make sure that there is no silent overflow
      even after the fix.
      
      -- Credits
      
      Thank you to the Apple team and to the other persons that helped me
      checking the patch and coordinating this communication.
      52a00201
  2. 12 Jun, 2018 15 commits
  3. 11 Jun, 2018 11 commits
  4. 10 Jun, 2018 3 commits
  5. 09 Jun, 2018 1 commit
  6. 08 Jun, 2018 5 commits
  7. 07 Jun, 2018 2 commits