- 12 Feb, 2017 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 09 Feb, 2017 1 commit
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antirez authored
After investigating issue #3796, it was discovered that MIGRATE could call migrateCloseSocket() after the original MIGRATE c->argv was already rewritten as a DEL operation. As a result the host/port passed to migrateCloseSocket() could be anything, often a NULL pointer that gets deferenced crashing the server. Now the socket is closed at an earlier time when there is a socket error in a later stage where no retry will be performed, before we rewrite the argument vector. Moreover a check was added so that later, in the socket_err label, there is no further attempt at closing the socket if the argument was rewritten. This fix should resolve the bug reported in #3796.
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- 31 Jan, 2017 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 30 Jan, 2017 6 commits
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antirez authored
Ziplists had a bug that was discovered while investigating a different issue, resulting in a corrupted ziplist representation, and a likely segmentation foult and/or data corruption of the last element of the ziplist, once the ziplist is accessed again. The bug happens when a specific set of insertions / deletions is performed so that an entry is encoded to have a "prevlen" field (the length of the previous entry) of 5 bytes but with a count that could be encoded in a "prevlen" field of a since byte. This could happen when the "cascading update" process called by ziplistInsert()/ziplistDelete() in certain contitious forces the prevlen to be bigger than necessary in order to avoid too much data moving around. Once such an entry is generated, inserting a very small entry immediately before it will result in a resizing of the ziplist for a count smaller than the current ziplist length (which is a violation, inserting code expects the ziplist to get bigger actually). So an FF byte is inserted in a misplaced position. Moreover a realloc() is performed with a count smaller than the ziplist current length so the final bytes could be trashed as well. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS: Currently it looks like an attacker can only crash a Redis server by providing specifically choosen commands. However a FF byte is written and there are other memory operations that depend on a wrong count, so even if it is not immediately apparent how to mount an attack in order to execute code remotely, it is not impossible at all that this could be done. Attacks always get better... and we did not spent enough time in order to think how to exploit this issue, but security researchers or malicious attackers could. REPRODUCING: The bug can be reproduced with the following commands. redis-cli del list redis-cli rpush list one redis-cli rpush list two redis-cli rpush list AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA redis-cli rpush list AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA redis-cli rpush list three redis-cli rpush list a redis-cli lrem list 1 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA redis-cli linsert list after AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 10 redis-cli lrange list 0 -1 Instead of "rpush list a", use "rpush list 10" in order to trigger a data corruption instead of a crash.
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miter authored
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oranagra authored
getExpire calls dictFind which can do rehashing. found by calling computeDatasetDigest from serverCron and running the test suite.
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Itamar Haber authored
Fixes https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/3639
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antirez authored
This problem was properly solved in 4.0 / unstable. Here is just a quick fix for the warning.
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antirez authored
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for example, via a POST request. For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order to never process further input. It was later verified that in a pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are not executed.
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- 27 Jan, 2017 2 commits
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antirez authored
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Jan-Erik Rediger authored
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- 21 Dec, 2016 1 commit
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Yossi Gottlieb authored
This happens if the server (mysteriously) returns an unexpected response to the COMMAND command.
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- 14 Dec, 2016 2 commits
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antirez authored
After the fix for #3673 the ttl var is always initialized inside the loop itself, so the early initialization is not needed. Variables declaration also moved to a more local scope.
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Jan-Erik Rediger authored
Before, if a previous key had a TTL set but the current one didn't, the TTL was reused and thus resulted in wrong expirations set. This behaviour was experienced, when `MigrateDefaultPipeline` in redis-trib was set to >1 Fixes #3655
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- 06 Dec, 2016 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 05 Dec, 2016 1 commit
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antirez authored
A bug was reported in the context in issue #3631. The root cause of the bug was that certain neighbor boxes were zeroed after the "inside the bounding box or not" check, simply because the bounding box computation function was wrong. A few debugging infos where enhanced and moved in other parts of the code. A check to avoid steps=0 was added, but is unrelated to this issue and I did not verified it was an actual bug in practice.
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- 16 Nov, 2016 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 31 Oct, 2016 2 commits
- 26 Oct, 2016 3 commits
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antirez authored
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zach shipko authored
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antirez authored
Compiling Redis worked as a side effect of jemalloc target specifying -ldl as needed linker options, otherwise it is not provided during linking and dlopen() API will remain unresolved symbols.
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- 26 Sep, 2016 2 commits
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
This commit fixes a vunlerability reported by Cory Duplantis of Cisco Talos, see TALOS-2016-0206 for reference. CONFIG SET client-output-buffer-limit accepts as client class "master" which is actually only used to implement CLIENT KILL. The "master" class has ID 3. What happens is that the global structure: server.client_obuf_limits[class] Is accessed with class = 3. However it is a 3 elements array, so writing the 4th element means to write up to 24 bytes of memory *after* the end of the array, since the structure is defined as: typedef struct clientBufferLimitsConfig { unsigned long long hard_limit_bytes; unsigned long long soft_limit_bytes; time_t soft_limit_seconds; } clientBufferLimitsConfig; EVALUATION OF IMPACT: Checking what's past the boundaries of the array in the global 'server' structure, we find AOF state fields: clientBufferLimitsConfig client_obuf_limits[CLIENT_TYPE_OBUF_COUNT]; /* AOF persistence */ int aof_state; /* AOF_(ON|OFF|WAIT_REWRITE) */ int aof_fsync; /* Kind of fsync() policy */ char *aof_filename; /* Name of the AOF file */ int aof_no_fsync_on_rewrite; /* Don't fsync if a rewrite is in prog. */ int aof_rewrite_perc; /* Rewrite AOF if % growth is > M and... */ off_t aof_rewrite_min_size; /* the AOF file is at least N bytes. */ off_t aof_rewrite_base_size; /* AOF size on latest startup or rewrite. */ off_t aof_current_size; /* AOF current size. */ Writing to most of these fields should be harmless and only cause problems in Redis persistence that should not escalate to security problems. However unfortunately writing to "aof_filename" could be potentially a security issue depending on the access pattern. Searching for "aof.filename" accesses in the source code returns many different usages of the field, including using it as input for open(), logging to the Redis log file or syslog, and calling the rename() syscall. It looks possible that attacks could lead at least to informations disclosure of the state and data inside Redis. However note that the attacker must already have access to the server. But, worse than that, it looks possible that being able to change the AOF filename can be used to mount more powerful attacks: like overwriting random files with AOF data (easily a potential security issue as demostrated here: http://antirez.com/news/96), or even more subtle attacks where the AOF filename is changed to a path were a malicious AOF file is loaded in order to exploit other potential issues when the AOF parser is fed with untrusted input (no known issue known currently). The fix checks the places where the 'master' class is specifiedf in order to access configuration data structures, and return an error in this cases. WHO IS AT RISK? The "master" client class was introduced in Redis in Jul 28 2015. Every Redis instance released past this date is not vulnerable while all the releases after this date are. Notably: Redis 3.0.x is NOT vunlerable. Redis 3.2.x IS vulnerable. Redis unstable is vulnerable. In order for the instance to be at risk, at least one of the following conditions must be true: 1. The attacker can access Redis remotely and is able to send the CONFIG SET command (often banned in managed Redis instances). 2. The attacker is able to control the "redis.conf" file and can wait or trigger a server restart. The problem was fixed 26th September 2016 in all the releases affected.
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- 12 Sep, 2016 2 commits
- 09 Sep, 2016 3 commits
- 05 Aug, 2016 1 commit
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rojingeorge authored
Display the nodes summary once the cluster is established using redis-trib.rb After the cluster meet and join was done, when the summary was shown, it was giving info regarding the nodes. This fix ensures that confusion where the slaves were shown as masters. Fix would be to reset the nodes and reload the cluster information before checking the cluster status after creating it.
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- 04 Aug, 2016 1 commit
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Guo Xiao authored
Fix warning: ISO C does not support '__FUNCTION__' predefined identifier [-Wpedantic]
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- 02 Aug, 2016 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 01 Aug, 2016 1 commit
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Qu Chen authored
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- 28 Jul, 2016 3 commits
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
This feature is useful, especially in deployments using Sentinel in order to setup Redis HA, where the slave is executed with NAT or port forwarding, so that the auto-detected port/ip addresses, as listed in the "INFO replication" output of the master, or as provided by the "ROLE" command, don't match the real addresses at which the slave is reachable for connections.
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antirez authored
Disabled by default, can be activated with -e. Maybe the reverse was more safe but departs from the past behavior.
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- 27 Jul, 2016 4 commits
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antirez authored
By grepping the continuous integration errors log a number of GEORADIUS tests failures were detected. Fortunately when a GEORADIUS failure happens, the test suite logs enough information in order to reproduce the problem: the PRNG seed, coordinates and radius of the query. By reproducing the issues, three different bugs were discovered and fixed in this commit. This commit also improves the already good reporting of the fuzzer and adds the failure vectors as regression tests. The issues found: 1. We need larger squares around the poles in order to cover the area requested by the user. There were already checks in order to use a smaller step (larger squares) but the limit set (+/- 67 degrees) is not enough in certain edge cases, so 66 is used now. 2. Even near the equator, when the search area center is very near the edge of the square, the north, south, west or ovest square may not be able to fully cover the specified radius. Now a test is performed at the edge of the initial guessed search area, and larger squares are used in case the test fails. 3. Because of rounding errors between Redis and Tcl, sometimes the test signaled false positives. This is now addressed. Whenever possible the original code was improved a bit in other ways. A debugging example stanza was added in order to make the next debugging session simpler when the next bug is found.
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antirez authored
In a previous commit the replication code was changed in order to centralize the BGSAVE for replication trigger in replicationCron(), however after further testings, the 1 second delay imposed by this change is not acceptable. So now the BGSAVE is only delayed if the AOF rewriting process is active. However past comments made sure that replicationCron() is always able to trigger the BGSAVE when needed, making the code generally more robust. The new code is more similar to the initial @oranagra patch where the BGSAVE was delayed only if an AOF rewrite was in progress. Trivia: delaying the BGSAVE uncovered a minor Sentinel issue that is now fixed.
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antirez authored
During the initial handshake with the master a slave will report to have a very high disconnection time from its master (since technically it was disconnected since forever, so the current UNIX time in seconds is reported). However when the slave is connected again the Sentinel may re-scan the INFO output again only after 10 seconds, which is a long time. During this time Sentinels will consider this instance unable to failover, so a useless delay is introduced. Actaully this hardly happened in the practice because when a slave's master is down, the INFO period for slaves changes to 1 second. However when a manual failover is attempted immediately after adding slaves (like in the case of the Sentinel unit test), this problem may happen. This commit changes the INFO period to 1 second even in the case the slave's master is not down, but the slave reported to be disconnected from the master (by publishing, last time we checked, a master disconnection time field in INFO). This change is required as a result of an unrelated change in the replication code that adds a small delay in the master-slave first synchronization.
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antirez authored
This patch, written in collaboration with Oran Agra (@oranagra) is a companion to 780a8b1d. Together the two patches should avoid that the AOF and RDB saving processes can be spawned at the same time. Previously conditions that could lead to two saving processes at the same time were: 1. When AOF is enabled via CONFIG SET and an RDB saving process is already active. 2. When the SYNC command decides to start an RDB saving process ASAP in order to serve a new slave that cannot partially resynchronize (but only if we have a disk target for replication, for diskless replication there is not such a problem). Condition "1" is not very severe but "2" can happen often and is definitely good at degrading Redis performances in an unexpected way. The two commits have the effect of always spawning RDB savings for replication in replicationCron() instead of attempting to start an RDB save synchronously. Moreover when a BGSAVE or AOF rewrite must be performed, they are instead just postponed using flags that will try to perform such operations ASAP. Finally the BGSAVE command was modified in order to accept a SCHEDULE option so that if an AOF rewrite is in progress, when this option is given, the command no longer returns an error, but instead schedules an RDB rewrite operation for when it will be possible to start it.
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