1. 12 Dec, 2022 1 commit
    • Meir Shpilraien (Spielrein)'s avatar
      Fix #11030, use lua_rawget to avoid triggering metatables and crash. (#11032) · e1b17f12
      Meir Shpilraien (Spielrein) authored
      Fix #11030, use lua_rawget to avoid triggering metatables.
      
      #11030 shows how return `_G` from the Lua script (either function or eval), cause the
      Lua interpreter to Panic and the Redis processes to exit with error code 1.
      Though return `_G` only panic on Redis 7 and 6.2.7, the underline issue exists on older
      versions as well (6.0 and 6.2). The underline issue is returning a table with a metatable
      such that the metatable raises an error.
      
      The following example demonstrate the issue:
      ```
      127.0.0.1:6379> eval "local a = {}; setmetatable(a,{__index=function() foo() end}) return a" 0
      Error: Server closed the connection
      ```
      ```
      PANIC: unprotected error in call to Lua API (user_script:1: Script attempted to access nonexistent global variable 'foo')
      ```
      
      The Lua panic happened because when returning the result to the client, Redis needs to
      introspect the returning table and transform the table into a resp. In order to scan the table,
      Redis uses `lua_gettable` api which might trigger the metatable (if exists) and might raise an error.
      This code is not running inside `pcall` (Lua protected call), so raising an error causes the
      Lua to panic and exit. Notice that this is not a crash, its a Lua panic that exit with error code 1.
      
      Returning `_G` panics on Redis 7 and 6.2.7 because on those versions `_G` has a metatable
      that raises error when trying to fetch a none existing key.
      
      ### Solution
      
      Instead of using `lua_gettable` that might raise error and cause the issue, use `lua_rawget`
      that simply return the value from the table without triggering any metatable logic.
      This is promised not to raise and error.
      
      The downside of this solution is that it might be considered as breaking change, if someone
      rely on metatable in the returned value. An alternative solution is to wrap this entire logic
      with `pcall` (Lua protected call), this alternative require a much bigger refactoring.
      
      ### Back Porting
      
      The same fix will work on older versions as well (6.2, 6.0). Notice that on those version,
      the issue can cause Redis to crash if inside the metatable logic there is an attempt to accesses
      Redis (`redis.call`). On 7.0, there is not crash and the `redis.call` is executed as if it was done
      from inside the script itself.
      
      ### Tests
      
      Tests was added the verify the fix
      
      (cherry picked from commit 020e046b)
      e1b17f12
  2. 06 Dec, 2022 1 commit
    • Meir Shpilraien (Spielrein)'s avatar
      Remove dead code on sorting reply on Lua scripts. (#10701) · 64c657a8
      Meir Shpilraien (Spielrein) authored
      On v6.2.7 a new mechanism was added to Lua scripts that allows
      filtering the globals of the Lua interpreter. This mechanism was
      added on the following commit: https://github.com/redis/redis/commit/11b602fbf8f9cdf8fc741c24625ab6287ab998a9
      
      One of the globals that was filtered out was `__redis__compare_helper`. This global
      was missed and was not added to the allow list or to the deny list. This is
      why we get the following warning when Redis starts:
      `A key '__redis__compare_helper' was added to Lua globals which is not on the globals allow list nor listed on the deny list.`
      
      After investigating the git blame log, the conclusion is that `__redis__compare_helper`
      is no longer needed, the PR deletes this function, and fixes the warning.
      
      Detailed Explanation:
      
      `__redis__compare_helper` was added on this commit: https://github.com/redis/redis/commit/2c861050c1
      Its purpose is to sort the replies of `SORT` command when script replication is enable and keep the replies
      deterministic and avoid primary and replica synchronization issues. On `SORT` command, there was a need for
      special compare function that are able to compare boolean values.
      
      The need to sort the `SORT` command reply was removed on this commit: https://github.com/redis/redis/commit/36741b2c818a95e8ef167818271614ee6b1bc414
      The sorting was moved to be part of the `SORT` command and there was not longer a need
      to sort it on the Lua interpreter. The commit made `__redis__compare_helper` a dead code but did
      not deleted it.
      64c657a8
  3. 27 Apr, 2022 5 commits
    • Oran Agra's avatar
    • Meir Shpilraien (Spielrein)'s avatar
      Clean Lua stack before parsing call reply to avoid crash on a call with many arguments (#9809) · 93c1d31d
      Meir Shpilraien (Spielrein) authored
      This commit 0f8b634c (CVE-2021-32626 released in 6.2.6, 6.0.16, 5.0.14)
      fixes an invalid memory write issue by using `lua_checkstack` API to make
      sure the Lua stack is not overflow. This fix was added on 3 places:
      1. `luaReplyToRedisReply`
      2. `ldbRedis`
      3. `redisProtocolToLuaType`
      
      On the first 2 functions, `lua_checkstack` is handled gracefully while the
      last is handled with an assert and a statement that this situation can
      not happened (only with misbehave module):
      
      > the Redis reply might be deep enough to explode the LUA stack (notice
      that currently there is no such command in Redis that returns such a nested
      reply, but modules might do it)
      
      The issue that was discovered is that user arguments is also considered part
      of the stack, and so the following script (for example) make the assertion reachable:
      ```
      local a = {}
      for i=1,7999 do
          a[i] = 1
      end
      return redis.call("lpush", "l", unpack(a))
      ```
      
      This is a regression because such a script would have worked before and now
      its crashing Redis. The solution is to clear the function arguments from the Lua
      stack which makes the original assumption true and the assertion unreachable.
      
      (cherry picked from commit 6b0b04f1)
      93c1d31d
    • meir's avatar
      Protect any table which is reachable from globals and added globals allow list. · 11b602fb
      meir authored
      The allow list is done by setting a metatable on the global table before initializing
      any library. The metatable set the `__newindex` field to a function that check
      the allow list before adding the field to the table. Fields which is not on the
      allow list are simply ignored.
      
      After initialization phase is done we protect the global table and each table
      that might be reachable from the global table. For each table we also protect
      the table metatable if exists.
      11b602fb
    • meir's avatar
      Protect globals of evals scripts. · b2ce3719
      meir authored
      Use the new `lua_enablereadonlytable` Lua API to protect the global tables of
      evals scripts. The implemetation is easy, we simply call `lua_enablereadonlytable`
      on the global table to turn it into a readonly table.
      b2ce3719
    • meir's avatar
      Move user eval function to be located on Lua registry. · 21414ad4
      meir authored
      Today, Redis wrap the user Lua code with a Lua function.
      For example, assuming the user code is:
      
      ```
      return redis.call('ping')
      ```
      
      The actual code that would have sent to the Lua interpreter was:
      
      ```
      f_b3a02c833904802db9c34a3cf1292eee3246df3c() return redis.call('ping') end
      ```
      
      The wraped code would have been saved on the global dictionary with the
      following name: `f_<script sha>` (in our example `f_b3a02c833904802db9c34a3cf1292eee3246df3c`).
      
      This approach allows one user to easily override the implementation a another user code, example:
      
      ```
      f_b3a02c833904802db9c34a3cf1292eee3246df3c = function() return 'hacked' end
      ```
      
      Running the above code will cause `evalsha b3a02c833904802db9c34a3cf1292eee3246df3c 0` to return
      hacked although it should have returned `pong`.
      
      Another disadventage is that Redis basically runs code on the loading (compiling) phase without been
      aware of it. User can do code injection like this:
      
      ```
      return 1 end <run code on compling phase> function() return 1
      ```
      
      The wraped code will look like this and the entire `<run code on compling phase>` block will run outside
      of eval or evalsha context:
      
      ```
      f_<sha>() return 1 end <run code on compling phase> function() return 1 end
      ```
      21414ad4
  4. 11 Apr, 2022 1 commit
  5. 04 Oct, 2021 2 commits
    • meir@redislabs.com's avatar
      Fix invalid memory write on lua stack overflow {CVE-2021-32626} · 8f241ab3
      meir@redislabs.com authored
      When LUA call our C code, by default, the LUA stack has room for 20
      elements. In most cases, this is more than enough but sometimes it's not
      and the caller must verify the LUA stack size before he pushes elements.
      
      On 3 places in the code, there was no verification of the LUA stack size.
      On specific inputs this missing verification could have lead to invalid
      memory write:
      1. On 'luaReplyToRedisReply', one might return a nested reply that will
         explode the LUA stack.
      2. On 'redisProtocolToLuaType', the Redis reply might be deep enough
         to explode the LUA stack (notice that currently there is no such
         command in Redis that returns such a nested reply, but modules might
         do it)
      3. On 'ldbRedis', one might give a command with enough arguments to
         explode the LUA stack (all the arguments will be pushed to the LUA
         stack)
      
      This commit is solving all those 3 issues by calling 'lua_checkstack' and
      verify that there is enough room in the LUA stack to push elements. In
      case 'lua_checkstack' returns an error (there is not enough room in the
      LUA stack and it's not possible to increase the stack), we will do the
      following:
      1. On 'luaReplyToRedisReply', we will return an error to the user.
      2. On 'redisProtocolToLuaType' we will exit with panic (we assume this
         scenario is rare because it can only happen with a module).
      3. On 'ldbRedis', we return an error.
      8f241ab3
    • meir@redislabs.com's avatar
      Fix protocol parsing on 'ldbReplParseCommand' (CVE-2021-32672) · 3e09be56
      meir@redislabs.com authored
      The protocol parsing on 'ldbReplParseCommand' (LUA debugging)
      Assumed protocol correctness. This means that if the following
      is given:
      *1
      $100
      test
      The parser will try to read additional 94 unallocated bytes after
      the client buffer.
      This commit fixes this issue by validating that there are actually enough
      bytes to read. It also limits the amount of data that can be sent by
      the debugger client to 1M so the client will not be able to explode
      the memory.
      3e09be56
  6. 01 Jun, 2021 1 commit
  7. 03 May, 2021 1 commit
  8. 26 Mar, 2021 1 commit
    • Huang Zhw's avatar
      make processCommand check publish channel permissions. (#8534) · e138698e
      Huang Zhw authored
      Add publish channel permissions check in processCommand.
      
      processCommand didn't check publish channel permissions, so we can
      queue a publish command in a transaction. But when exec the transaction,
      it will fail with -NOPERM.
      
      We also union keys/commands/channels permissions check togegher in
      ACLCheckAllPerm. Remove pubsubCheckACLPermissionsOrReply in 
      publishCommand/subscribeCommand/psubscribeCommand. Always 
      check permissions in processCommand/execCommand/
      luaRedisGenericCommand.
      e138698e
  9. 17 Mar, 2021 1 commit
    • Meir Shpilraien (Spielrein)'s avatar
      Fix script kill to work also on scripts that use pcall (#8661) · 9ae4f5c7
      Meir Shpilraien (Spielrein) authored
      pcall function runs another LUA function in protected mode, this means
      that any error will be caught by this function and will not stop the LUA
      execution. The script kill mechanism uses error to stop the running script.
      Scripts that uses pcall can catch the error raise by the script kill mechanism,
      this will cause a script like this to be unkillable:
      
      local f = function()
              while 1 do
                      redis.call('ping')
              end
      end
      while 1 do
              pcall(f)
      end
      
      The fix is, when we want to kill the script, we set the hook function to be invoked 
      after each line. This will promise that the execution will get another
      error before it is able to enter the pcall function again.
      9ae4f5c7
  10. 15 Mar, 2021 1 commit
    • guybe7's avatar
      Missing EXEC on modules propagation after failed EVAL execution (#8654) · dba33a94
      guybe7 authored
      1. moduleReplicateMultiIfNeeded should use server.in_eval like
         moduleHandlePropagationAfterCommandCallback
      2. server.in_eval could have been set to 1 and not reset back
         to 0 (a lot of missed early-exits after in_eval is already 1)
      
      Note: The new assertions in processCommand cover (2) and I added
      two module tests to cover (1)
      
      Implications:
      If an EVAL that failed (and thus left server.in_eval=1) runs before a module
      command that replicates, the replication stream will contain MULTI (because
      moduleReplicateMultiIfNeeded used to check server.lua_caller which is NULL
      at this point) but not EXEC (because server.in_eval==1)
      This only affects modules as module.c the only user of server.in_eval.
      
      Affects versions 6.2.0, 6.2.1
      dba33a94
  11. 24 Feb, 2021 2 commits
  12. 09 Feb, 2021 1 commit
  13. 15 Jan, 2021 1 commit
    • Yang Bodong's avatar
      Add lazyfree-lazy-user-flush config to control default behavior of... · 294f93af
      Yang Bodong authored
      Add lazyfree-lazy-user-flush config to control default behavior of FLUSH[ALL|DB], SCRIPT FLUSH (#8258)
      
      * Adds ASYNC and SYNC arguments to SCRIPT FLUSH
      * Adds SYNC argument to FLUSHDB and FLUSHALL
      * Adds new config to control the default behavior of FLUSHDB, FLUSHALL and SCRIPT FLUASH.
      
      the new behavior is as follows:
      * FLUSH[ALL|DB],SCRIPT FLUSH: Determine sync or async according to the
        value of lazyfree-lazy-user-flush.
      * FLUSH[ALL|DB],SCRIPT FLUSH ASYNC: Always flushes the database in an async manner.
      * FLUSH[ALL|DB],SCRIPT FLUSH SYNC: Always flushes the database in a sync manner.
      294f93af
  14. 05 Jan, 2021 1 commit
    • Oran Agra's avatar
      Fix wrong order of key/value in Lua map response (#8266) · 2017407b
      Oran Agra authored
      When a Lua script returns a map to redis (a feature which was added in
      redis 6 together with RESP3), it would have returned the value first and
      the key second.
      
      If the client was using RESP2, it was getting them out of order, and if
      the client was in RESP3, it was getting a map of value => key.
      This was happening regardless of the Lua script using redis.setresp(3)
      or not.
      
      This also affects a case where the script was returning a map which it got
      from from redis by doing something like: redis.setresp(3); return redis.call()
      
      This fix is a breaking change for redis 6.0 users who happened to rely
      on the wrong order (either ones that used redis.setresp(3), or ones that
      returned a map explicitly).
      
      This commit also includes other two changes in the tests:
      1. The test suite now handles RESP3 maps as dicts rather than nested
         lists
      2. Remove some redundant (duplicate) tests from tracking.tcl
      2017407b
  15. 04 Jan, 2021 1 commit
    • Itamar Haber's avatar
      HELP subcommand, continued (#5531) · 9dcdc7e7
      Itamar Haber authored
      
      
      * man-like consistent long formatting
      * Uppercases commands, subcommands and options
      * Adds 'HELP' to HELP for all
      * Lexicographical order
      * Uses value notation and other .md likeness
      * Moves const char *help to top
      * Keeps it under 80 chars
      * Misc help typos, consistent conjuctioning (i.e return and not returns)
      * Uses addReplySubcommandSyntaxError(c) all over
      Signed-off-by: default avatarItamar Haber <itamar@redislabs.com>
      9dcdc7e7
  16. 27 Dec, 2020 1 commit
    • Oran Agra's avatar
      Fix memory leaks in error replies due to recent change (#8249) · 049cf8cd
      Oran Agra authored
      Recently efaf09ee started using addReplyErrorSds in place of
      addReplySds the later takes ownership of the string but the former did
      not.
      This introduced memory leaks when a script returns an error to redis,
      and also in clusterRedirectClient (two new usages of
      addReplyErrorSds which was mostly unused till now.
      
      This commit chagnes two thanks.
      1. change addReplyErrorSds to take ownership of the error string.
      2. scripting.c doesn't actually need to use addReplyErrorSds, it's a
      perfect match for addReplyErrorFormat (replaces newlines with spaces)
      049cf8cd
  17. 24 Dec, 2020 1 commit
  18. 22 Dec, 2020 1 commit
    • Oran Agra's avatar
      Remove read-only flag from non-keyspace cmds, different approach for EXEC to... · 411c18bb
      Oran Agra authored
      Remove read-only flag from non-keyspace cmds, different approach for EXEC to propagate MULTI (#8216)
      
      In the distant history there was only the read flag for commands, and whatever
      command that didn't have the read flag was a write one.
      Then we added the write flag, but some portions of the code still used !read
      Also some commands that don't work on the keyspace at all, still have the read
      flag.
      
      Changes in this commit:
      1. remove the read-only flag from TIME, ECHO, ROLE and LASTSAVE
      
      2. EXEC command used to decides if it should propagate a MULTI by looking at
         the command flags (!read & !admin).
         When i was about to change it to look at the write flag instead, i realized
         that this would cause it not to propagate a MULTI for PUBLISH, EVAL, and
         SCRIPT, all 3 are not marked as either a read command or a write one (as
         they should), but all 3 are calling forceCommandPropagation.
      
         So instead of introducing a new flag to denote a command that "writes" but
         not into the keyspace, and still needs propagation, i decided to rely on
         the forceCommandPropagation, and just fix the code to propagate MULTI when
         needed rather than depending on the command flags at all.
      
         The implication of my change then is that now it won't decide to propagate
         MULTI when it sees one of these: SELECT, PING, INFO, COMMAND, TIME and
         other commands which are neither read nor write.
      
      3. Changing getNodeByQuery and clusterRedirectBlockedClientIfNeeded in
         cluster.c to look at !write rather than read flag.
         This should have no implications, since these code paths are only reachable
         for commands which access keys, and these are always marked as either read
         or write.
      
      This commit improve MULTI propagation tests, for modules and a bunch of
      other special cases, all of which used to pass already before that commit.
      the only one that test change that uncovered a change of behavior is the
      one that DELs a non-existing key, it used to propagate an empty
      multi-exec block, and no longer does.
      411c18bb
  19. 06 Dec, 2020 1 commit
    • guybe7's avatar
      Make sure we do not propagate nested MULTI/EXEC (#8097) · 1df5bb56
      guybe7 authored
      One way this was happening is when a module issued an RM_Call which would inject MULTI.
      If the module command that does that was itself issued by something else that already did
      added MULTI (e.g. another module, or a Lua script), it would have caused nested MULTI.
      
      In fact the MULTI state in the client or the MULTI_EMITTED flag in the context isn't
      the right indication that we need to propagate MULTI or not, because on a nested calls
      (possibly a module action called by a keyspace event of another module action), these
      flags aren't retained / reflected.
      
      instead there's now a global propagate_in_transaction flag for that.
      
      in addition to that, we now have a global in_eval and in_exec flags, to serve the flags
      of RM_GetContextFlags, since their dependence on the current client is wrong for the same
      reasons mentioned above.
      1df5bb56
  20. 01 Dec, 2020 1 commit
    • Itamar Haber's avatar
      Adds pub/sub channel patterns to ACL (#7993) · c1b1e8c3
      Itamar Haber authored
      Fixes #7923.
      
      This PR appropriates the special `&` symbol (because `@` and `*` are taken),
      followed by a literal value or pattern for describing the Pub/Sub patterns that
      an ACL user can interact with. It is similar to the existing key patterns
      mechanism in function (additive) and implementation (copy-pasta). It also adds
      the allchannels and resetchannels ACL keywords, naturally.
      
      The default user is given allchannels permissions, whereas new users get
      whatever is defined by the acl-pubsub-default configuration directive. For
      backward compatibility in 6.2, the default of this directive is allchannels but
      this is likely to be changed to resetchannels in the next major version for
      stronger default security settings.
      
      Unless allchannels is set for the user, channel access permissions are checked
      as follows :
      * Calls to both PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE will fail unless a pattern matching the
        argumentative channel name(s) exists for the user.
      * Calls t...
      c1b1e8c3
  21. 17 Nov, 2020 1 commit
    • Meir Shpilraien (Spielrein)'s avatar
      Unified MULTI, LUA, and RM_Call with respect to blocking commands (#8025) · d87a0d02
      Meir Shpilraien (Spielrein) authored
      
      
      Blocking command should not be used with MULTI, LUA, and RM_Call. This is because,
      the caller, who executes the command in this context, expects a reply.
      
      Today, LUA and MULTI have a special (and different) treatment to blocking commands:
      
      LUA   - Most commands are marked with no-script flag which are checked when executing
      and command from LUA, commands that are not marked (like XREAD) verify that their
      blocking mode is not used inside LUA (by checking the CLIENT_LUA client flag).
      MULTI - Command that is going to block, first verify that the client is not inside
      multi (by checking the CLIENT_MULTI client flag). If the client is inside multi, they
      return a result which is a match to the empty key with no timeout (for example blpop
      inside MULTI will act as lpop)
      For modules that perform RM_Call with blocking command, the returned results type is
      REDISMODULE_REPLY_UNKNOWN and the caller can not really know what happened.
      
      Disadvantages of the current state are:
      
      No unified approach, LUA, MULTI, and RM_Call, each has a different treatment
      Module can not safely execute blocking command (and get reply or error).
      Though It is true that modules are not like LUA or MULTI and should be smarter not
      to execute blocking commands on RM_Call, sometimes you want to execute a command base
      on client input (for example if you create a module that provides a new scripting
      language like javascript or python).
      While modules (on modules command) can check for REDISMODULE_CTX_FLAGS_LUA or
      REDISMODULE_CTX_FLAGS_MULTI to know not to block the client, there is no way to
      check if the command came from another module using RM_Call. So there is no way
      for a module to know not to block another module RM_Call execution.
      
      This commit adds a way to unify the treatment for blocking clients by introducing
      a new CLIENT_DENY_BLOCKING client flag. On LUA, MULTI, and RM_Call the new flag
      turned on to signify that the client should not be blocked. A blocking command
      verifies that the flag is turned off before blocking. If a blocking command sees
      that the CLIENT_DENY_BLOCKING flag is on, it's not blocking and return results
      which are matches to empty key with no timeout (as MULTI does today).
      
      The new flag is checked on the following commands:
      
      List blocking commands: BLPOP, BRPOP, BRPOPLPUSH, BLMOVE,
      Zset blocking commands: BZPOPMIN, BZPOPMAX
      Stream blocking commands: XREAD, XREADGROUP
      SUBSCRIBE, PSUBSCRIBE, MONITOR
      In addition, the new flag is turned on inside the AOF client, we do not want to
      block the AOF client to prevent deadlocks and commands ordering issues (and there
      is also an existing assert in the code that verifies it).
      
      To keep backward compatibility on LUA, all the no-script flags on existing commands
      were kept untouched. In addition, a LUA special treatment on XREAD and XREADGROUP was kept.
      
      To keep backward compatibility on MULTI (which today allows SUBSCRIBE, and PSUBSCRIBE).
      We added a special treatment on those commands to allow executing them on MULTI.
      
      The only backward compatibility issue that this PR introduces is that now MONITOR
      is not allowed inside MULTI.
      
      Tests were added to verify blocking commands are not blocking the client on LUA, MULTI,
      or RM_Call. Tests were added to verify the module can check for CLIENT_DENY_BLOCKING flag.
      Co-authored-by: default avatarOran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
      Co-authored-by: default avatarItamar Haber <itamar@redislabs.com>
      d87a0d02
  22. 20 Sep, 2020 1 commit
  23. 10 Sep, 2020 1 commit
    • Oran Agra's avatar
      Squash merging 125 typo/grammar/comment/doc PRs (#7773) · 1c710385
      Oran Agra authored
      List of squashed commits or PRs
      ===============================
      
      commit 66801ea
      Author: hwware <wen.hui.ware@gmail.com>
      Date:   Mon Jan 13 00:54:31 2020 -0500
      
          typo fix in acl.c
      
      commit 46f55db
      Author: Itamar Haber <itamar@redislabs.com>
      Date:   Sun Sep 6 18:24:11 2020 +0300
      
          Updates a couple of comments
      
          Specifically:
      
          * RM_AutoMemory completed instead of pointing to docs
          * Updated link to custom type doc
      
      commit 61a2aa0
      Author: xindoo <xindoo@qq.com>
      Date:   Tue Sep 1 19:24:59 2020 +0800
      
          Correct errors in code comments
      
      commit a5871d1
      Author: yz1509 <pro-756@qq.com>
      Date:   Tue Sep 1 18:36:06 2020 +0800
      
          fix typos in module.c
      
      commit 41eede7
      Author: bookug <bookug@qq.com>
      Date:   Sat Aug 15 01:11:33 2020 +0800
      
          docs: fix typos in comments
      
      commit c303c84
      Author: lazy-snail <ws.niu@outlook.com>
      Date:   Fri Aug 7 11:15:44 2020 +0800
      
          fix spelling in redis.conf
      
      commit 1e...
      1c710385
  24. 03 Sep, 2020 1 commit
    • Oran Agra's avatar
      Run active defrag while blocked / loading (#7726) · 9ef8d2f6
      Oran Agra authored
      During long running scripts or loading RDB/AOF, we may need to do some
      defragging. Since processEventsWhileBlocked is called periodically at
      unknown intervals, and many cron jobs either depend on run_with_period
      (including active defrag), or rely on being called at server.hz rate
      (i.e. active defrag knows ho much time to run by looking at server.hz),
      the whileBlockedCron may have to run a loop triggering the cron jobs in it
      (currently only active defrag) several times.
      
      Other changes:
      - Adding a test for defrag during aof loading.
      - Changing key-load-delay config to take negative values for fractions
        of a microsecond sleep
      9ef8d2f6
  25. 06 Apr, 2020 1 commit
  26. 04 Feb, 2020 2 commits
  27. 30 Jan, 2020 1 commit
  28. 27 Jan, 2020 1 commit
  29. 20 Jan, 2020 1 commit
    • srzhao's avatar
      Check OOM at script start to get stable lua OOM state. · 38f6207f
      srzhao authored
      Checking OOM by `getMaxMemoryState` inside script might get different result
      with `freeMemoryIfNeededAndSafe` at script start, because lua stack and
      arguments also consume memory.
      
      This leads to memory `borderline` when memory grows near server.maxmemory:
      
      - `freeMemoryIfNeededAndSafe` at script start detects no OOM, no memory freed
      - `getMaxMemoryState` inside script detects OOM, script aborted
      
      We solve this 'borderline' issue by saving OOM state at script start to get
      stable lua OOM state.
      
      related to issue #6565 and #5250.
      38f6207f
  30. 17 Dec, 2019 3 commits
  31. 22 Nov, 2019 1 commit