- 27 Jun, 2017 4 commits
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antirez authored
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Antonio Mallia authored
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Zachary Marquez authored
Proposed fix to https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/4027
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antirez authored
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- 22 Jun, 2017 4 commits
- 20 Jun, 2017 4 commits
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minghang.zmh authored
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xuchengxuan authored
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cbgbt authored
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Aric Huang authored
Fix a few typos/adjust wording in `create-cluster` README
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- 14 Jun, 2017 1 commit
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Salvatore Sanfilippo authored
Implement getKeys procedure for georadius and georadiusbymember commands
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- 17 May, 2017 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 15 May, 2017 1 commit
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antirez authored
Close #3993.
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- 21 Apr, 2017 4 commits
- 20 Apr, 2017 1 commit
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张文康 authored
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- 14 Apr, 2017 1 commit
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antirez authored
And many other related Github issues... all reporting the same problem. There was probably just not enough backlog in certain unlucky runs. I'll ask people that can reporduce if they see now this as fixed as well.
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- 08 Apr, 2017 1 commit
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Qu Chen authored
commands.
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- 20 Feb, 2017 2 commits
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John.Koepi authored
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antirez authored
Close #3804.
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- 12 Feb, 2017 2 commits
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
This reverts commit 153f2f00. Jemalloc 4.4.0 is apparently causing deadlocks in certain systems. See for example https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/3799. As a cautionary step we are reverting the commit back and releasing a new stable Redis version.
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- 09 Feb, 2017 1 commit
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antirez authored
After investigating issue #3796, it was discovered that MIGRATE could call migrateCloseSocket() after the original MIGRATE c->argv was already rewritten as a DEL operation. As a result the host/port passed to migrateCloseSocket() could be anything, often a NULL pointer that gets deferenced crashing the server. Now the socket is closed at an earlier time when there is a socket error in a later stage where no retry will be performed, before we rewrite the argument vector. Moreover a check was added so that later, in the socket_err label, there is no further attempt at closing the socket if the argument was rewritten. This fix should resolve the bug reported in #3796.
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- 31 Jan, 2017 1 commit
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antirez authored
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- 30 Jan, 2017 7 commits
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antirez authored
Ziplists had a bug that was discovered while investigating a different issue, resulting in a corrupted ziplist representation, and a likely segmentation foult and/or data corruption of the last element of the ziplist, once the ziplist is accessed again. The bug happens when a specific set of insertions / deletions is performed so that an entry is encoded to have a "prevlen" field (the length of the previous entry) of 5 bytes but with a count that could be encoded in a "prevlen" field of a since byte. This could happen when the "cascading update" process called by ziplistInsert()/ziplistDelete() in certain contitious forces the prevlen to be bigger than necessary in order to avoid too much data moving around. Once such an entry is generated, inserting a very small entry immediately before it will result in a resizing of the ziplist for a count smaller than the current ziplist length (which is a violation, inserting code expects the ziplist to get bigger actually). So an FF byte is inserted in a misplaced position. Moreover a realloc() is performed with a count smaller than the ziplist current length so the final bytes could be trashed as well. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS: Currently it looks like an attacker can only crash a Redis server by providing specifically choosen commands. However a FF byte is written and there are other memory operations that depend on a wrong count, so even if it is not immediately apparent how to mount an attack in order to execute code remotely, it is not impossible at all that this could be done. Attacks always get better... and we did not spent enough time in order to think how to exploit this issue, but security researchers or malicious attackers could. REPRODUCING: The bug can be reproduced with the following commands. redis-cli del list redis-cli rpush list one redis-cli rpush list two redis-cli rpush list AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA redis-cli rpush list AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA redis-cli rpush list three redis-cli rpush list a redis-cli lrem list 1 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA redis-cli linsert list after AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA 10 redis-cli lrange list 0 -1 Instead of "rpush list a", use "rpush list 10" in order to trigger a data corruption instead of a crash.
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antirez authored
The original jemalloc source tree was modified to: 1. Remove the configure error that prevents nested builds. 2. Insert the Redis private Jemalloc API in order to allow the Redis fragmentation function to work.
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miter authored
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oranagra authored
getExpire calls dictFind which can do rehashing. found by calling computeDatasetDigest from serverCron and running the test suite.
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Itamar Haber authored
Fixes https://github.com/antirez/redis/issues/3639
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antirez authored
This problem was properly solved in 4.0 / unstable. Here is just a quick fix for the warning.
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antirez authored
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for example, via a POST request. For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order to never process further input. It was later verified that in a pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are not executed.
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- 27 Jan, 2017 2 commits
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antirez authored
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Jan-Erik Rediger authored
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- 21 Dec, 2016 1 commit
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Yossi Gottlieb authored
This happens if the server (mysteriously) returns an unexpected response to the COMMAND command.
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- 14 Dec, 2016 2 commits
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antirez authored
After the fix for #3673 the ttl var is always initialized inside the loop itself, so the early initialization is not needed. Variables declaration also moved to a more local scope.
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Jan-Erik Rediger authored
Before, if a previous key had a TTL set but the current one didn't, the TTL was reused and thus resulted in wrong expirations set. This behaviour was experienced, when `MigrateDefaultPipeline` in redis-trib was set to >1 Fixes #3655
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