- 12 Feb, 2019 1 commit
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zhaozhao.zz authored
In mostly production environment, normal user's behavior should be limited. Now in redis ACL mechanism we can do it like that: user default on +@all ~* -@dangerous nopass user admin on +@all ~* >someSeriousPassword Then the default normal user can not execute dangerous commands like FLUSHALL/KEYS. But some admin commands are in dangerous category too like PSYNC, and the configurations above will forbid replica from sync with master. Finally I think we could add a new configuration for replication, it is masteruser option, like this: masteruser admin masterauth someSeriousPassword Then replica will try AUTH admin someSeriousPassword and get privilege to execute PSYNC. If masteruser is NULL, replica would AUTH with only masterauth like before.
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- 11 Feb, 2019 4 commits
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Salvatore Sanfilippo authored
Don't assume the __x86_64__ pointer size to avoid warnings on x32
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Chris Lamb authored
__x86_64__ is defined on the on the x32 architecture and the conditionals in debug.c therefore assume the size of (void*) etc: debug.c: In function 'getMcontextEip': debug.c:757:12: warning: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Wint-to-pointer-cast] return (void*) uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[16]; /* Linux 64 */ ^ debug.c: In function 'logRegisters': debug.c:920:21: warning: cast to pointer from integer of different size [-Wint-to-pointer-cast] logStackContent((void**)uc->uc_mcontext.gregs[15]); We can remedy this by checking for __ILP32__ first. See: https://wiki.debian.org/ArchitectureSpecificsMemo ... for more info.
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antirez authored
Soon or later we may have code in freeClient() that may have to deal with ACLs. Imagine for instance the command proposed multiple times (not sure if this will ever be accepted but still...): ONCLOSE DEL mykey Accumulating commands to run when a client is disconnected. Now the function is compatible with such use cases. Related to #5829.
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zhaozhao.zz authored
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- 08 Feb, 2019 4 commits
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
We can't trust modules commands flagging, so module commands must be always explicitly added, with the exception of +@all that will include everything. However something like +@readonly should not include command from modules that may be potentially dangerous: our categories must be safe and reliable and modules may not be like that.
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antirez authored
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- 07 Feb, 2019 9 commits
- 06 Feb, 2019 3 commits
- 05 Feb, 2019 4 commits
- 04 Feb, 2019 6 commits
- 01 Feb, 2019 4 commits
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
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antirez authored
It does not make much sense to limit what modules can do: the admin should instead limit what module commnads an user may call. So RedisModule_Call() and other module operations should be able to execute everything they want: the limitation should be posed by the API exported by the module itself.
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antirez authored
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- 31 Jan, 2019 5 commits