- 29 Mar, 2023 1 commit
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Itamar Haber authored
This is an attempt to normalize/formalize command summaries. Main actions performed: * Starts with the continuation of the phrase "The XXXX command, when called, ..." for user commands. * Starts with "An internal command...", "A container command...", etc... when applicable. * Always uses periods. * Refrains from referring to other commands. If this is needed, backquotes should be used for command names. * Tries to be very clear about the data type when applicable. * Tries to mention additional effects, e.g. "The key is created if it doesn't exist" and "The set is deleted if the last member is removed." * Prefers being terse over verbose. * Tries to be consistent.
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- 11 Mar, 2023 1 commit
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guybe7 authored
Work in progress towards implementing a reply schema as part of COMMAND DOCS, see #9845 Since ironing the details of the reply schema of each and every command can take a long time, we would like to merge this PR when the infrastructure is ready, and let this mature in the unstable branch. Meanwhile the changes of this PR are internal, they are part of the repo, but do not affect the produced build. ### Background In #9656 we add a lot of information about Redis commands, but we are missing information about the replies ### Motivation 1. Documentation. This is the primary goal. 2. It should be possible, based on the output of COMMAND, to be able to generate client code in typed languages. In order to do that, we need Redis to tell us, in detail, what each reply looks like. 3. We would like to build a fuzzer that verifies the reply structure (for now we use the existing testsuite, see the "Testing" section) ### Schema...
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- 22 Dec, 2021 1 commit
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Oran Agra authored
## background Till now CONFIG SET was blocked during loading. (In the not so distant past, GET was disallowed too) We recently (not released yet) added an async-loading mode, see #9323, and during that time it'll serve CONFIG SET and any other command. And now we realized (#9770) that some configs, and commands are dangerous during async-loading. ## changes * Allow most CONFIG SET during loading (both on async-loading and normal loading) * Allow CONFIG REWRITE and CONFIG RESETSTAT during loading * Block a few config during loading (`appendonly`, `repl-diskless-load`, and `dir`) * Block a few commands during loading (list below) ## the blocked commands: * SAVE - obviously we don't wanna start a foregreound save during loading 8-) * BGSAVE - we don't mind to schedule one, but we don't wanna fork now * BGREWRITEAOF - we don't mind to schedule one, but we don't wanna fork now * MODULE - we obviously don't wanna unload a module during replication / rdb loading (MODULE HELP and MODULE LIST are not blocked) * SYNC / PSYNC - we're in the middle of RDB loading from master, must not allow sync requests now. * REPLICAOF / SLAVEOF - we're in the middle of replicating, maybe it makes sense to let the user abort it, but he couldn't do that so far, i don't wanna take any risk of bugs due to odd state. * CLUSTER - only allow [HELP, SLOTS, NODES, INFO, MYID, LINKS, KEYSLOT, COUNTKEYSINSLOT, GETKEYSINSLOT, RESET, REPLICAS, COUNT_FAILURE_REPORTS], for others, preserve the status quo ## other fixes * processEventsWhileBlocked had an issue when being nested, this could happen with a busy script during async loading (new), but also in a busy script during AOF loading (old). this lead to a crash in the scenario described in #6988
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- 19 Dec, 2021 1 commit
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YaacovHazan authored
Block sensitive configs and commands by default. * `enable-protected-configs` - block modification of configs with the new `PROTECTED_CONFIG` flag. Currently we add this flag to `dbfilename`, and `dir` configs, all of which are non-mutable configs that can set a file redis will write to. * `enable-debug-command` - block the `DEBUG` command * `enable-module-command` - block the `MODULE` command These have a default value set to `no`, so that these features are not exposed by default to client connections, and can only be set by modifying the config file. Users can change each of these to either `yes` (allow all access), or `local` (allow access from local TCP connections and unix domain connections) Note that this is a **breaking change** (specifically the part about MODULE command being disabled by default). I.e. we don't consider DEBUG command being blocked as an issue (people shouldn't have been using it), and the few configs we protected are unlikely to have been set at runtime anyway. On the other hand, it's likely to assume some users who use modules, load them from the config file anyway. Note that's the whole point of this PR, for redis to be more secure by default and reduce the attack surface on innocent users, so secure defaults will necessarily mean a breaking change.
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- 15 Dec, 2021 1 commit
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guybe7 authored
Delete the hardcoded command table and replace it with an auto-generated table, based on a JSON file that describes the commands (each command must have a JSON file). These JSON files are the SSOT of everything there is to know about Redis commands, and it is reflected fully in COMMAND INFO. These JSON files are used to generate commands.c (using a python script), which is then committed to the repo and compiled. The purpose is: * Clients and proxies will be able to get much more info from redis, instead of relying on hard coded logic. * drop the dependency between Redis-user and the commands.json in redis-doc. * delete help.h and have redis-cli learn everything it needs to know just by issuing COMMAND (will be done in a separate PR) * redis.io should stop using commands.json and learn everything from Redis (ultimately one of the release artifacts should be a large JSON, containing all the information about all of the commands, ...
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